Identity Crisis
As a computer professional and IEEE member for 17
years, I was deeply insulted when IEEE Spectrum arrived
with “ID Theft costs hundreds of billions a year”
emblazoned on its cover. Not only is this false, the
article itself [“A Touch
of Money,” July] assailed the whacky
methodology of the Aberdeen Group. The global trade in
drugs is hundreds of billions a year, US $100 billion at
wholesale and $300 billion at retail, according to the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s World Drug Report
2005 (Vienna, June 2005), p. 127. When you say more
criminals make their money with ID theft than drugs, you
make all engineers look like they can’t do math.
The rest of the article is an advertisement for
emerging biometric technologies. The authors present no
evidence that the ID theft problem is a technical
problem. It is a fraud problem. Abraham Abdallah
committed bank fraud at Merrill Lynch and wire fraud
with the online purchases. If his fraud was made easier
by the use of the Internet, then we have to ask who
caused fraud to be made easy. Was it Thomas Siebel,
whose only action was to have money on deposit at
Merrill Lynch? No. It was Merrill Lynch, which somehow
deployed a system where $10 million could be transferred
without any real authentication.
We need fraud laws more generally like the laws for
credit card fraud. Let Merrill Lynch management know
they will have to return $9 999 950 of their profits to
Siebel unless they can prove he authorized the transfer.
The motive for good security will be with the people who
field the systems—problem solved.
With motives in the right place, you can post
everyone’s Social Security number on the Internet. Banks
will pay engineers to deploy the most cost-effective
solution. Who knows, they might need to use some new
biometric technology. I personally doubt it, but at
least then we’d be having an engineering discussion of
the costs versus benefits of different technologies.
That’s the sort of content I expect in the flagship
publication of the engineering community.
Randy Saunders
IEEE Member
Clarksville, Md.
The article makes the proposed system sound better
then it really is. First of all, there’s no need to get
the fingerprint from a glass, for example. A stolen
wallet will have parts of the print on the credit cards
since you use it as an authentication method. Although
these are not complete, a carefully designed algorithm
can reconstruct the complete fingerprint out of the
available chunks. Furthermore, the anticipated scheme
still uses a magnetic stripe on the card. The stripe is
simply waiting for an okay to be released, and a simple
override can send a fake okay.
Additionally, the authors did not mention the
“Failure to Enroll” problem. In this last case, a lack
of unique features or sufficient fingerprint data
prevent the person from enrolling into the system. For
example, construction workers use their hands for heavy
work, which often causes worn out and hidden
fingerprints. Finally, using the system for an online
transaction does not really change anything other than
giving an eavesdropper more data to work around.
Richard Kheir
IEEE Student Member
Villanova, Pa.
The fundamental problem with online shopping nowadays
is that it is, technically speaking, an “open-loop”
system, which may produce a “steady-state error” in the
form of a fraudulent charge on one’s bill. To get rid of
this problem, the system should be designed to include
the account holder in the “feedback path.”
Consider this scenario. When you apply for a credit
card, you specify your e-mail address. When placing an
online order, this address will be verified along with
your billing information, and a unique order code will
be sent to the address. You will have to retrieve this
code and use it to complete your online transaction.
However the system is designed, it should use the
principle known to engineers since the steam engine era:
close the loop!
Konstantin Louganski
IEEE Student Member
Blacksburg, Va.
Assessing Metcalfe’s Law
There’s a simple measure of the value of networks
that is ignored by all the models discussed in “Metcalfe’s
Law Is Wrong” [July]. Each additional
connection is only as valuable as the new information
that it adds to the body of knowledge accessible via the
network. New people joining a network will bring
knowledge that is mostly already represented therein, at
best adding just a few new items. The probability that a
new member will add new knowledge decreases
exponentially with the number of people already in the
network.
The cost of querying the network, however, as
measured by the amount of time spent by the members of
the network responding to queries, increases linearly
with the number of people in the network. When the
incremental cost of a new connection exceeds the
information value that it adds, the value of the network
starts decreasing. Large networks may therefore actually
have less information value to their members than
smaller networks.
Donald E. Strebel
IEEE Member
Columbia, Md.
Thank you for the thought-provoking article,
“Metcalfe’s Law Is Wrong”. The authors are, however,
somewhat harsh in their assessment of Metcalfe’s Law by
judging it on its applicability to the market value of
network service providers. It is important to clearly
define the terms in any formula or law, and in its
original form the value was clearly understood as the
value derived from connectivity. In this interpretation,
the law is intuitive, as connectivity is straightforward
to determine in the case of an Ethernet local area
network or even the early Internet.
The assumption that the value of each additional
connection is arbitrary but constant would indicate that
we are talking here about potential value as opposed to
actual value. To say that the law must be wrong because
we don’t observe the massive merging or interconnecting
of networks is to take a far too simplistic view. There
are many factors that limit the actual value achievable
by network operators, such as the cost and availability
of capital, operational costs, technical
interoperability, cultural differences, regulation,
pricing, and operator politics, to mention a few. For
in-depth articles on network economics, the authors may
wish to consult Nicolas Economides’ excellent site at
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/site.html.
On the technical side, we must take into account the
fact that the Internet has become fragmented by software
diversity, firewalls, network address translation
gateways, and the like. This no longer corresponds to
the original end-to-end connectivity model assumed by
Metcalfe's Law, which says: “The systemic value of
compatibly communicating devices grows as the square of
their number.”
I would like to see the original law reinstated and
used as a driver for the communications industry—much as
Moore’s Law has been used in the semiconductor industry.
Its role is to encourage the network operators to
maximize the potential value for their users by
restoring unencumbered end-to-end connectivity across
their networks. The resulting value perceived by the
users will ultimately drive the growth of the industry’s
actual market value—subject, of course, to basic
economic principles.
Dave Penkler
IEEE Member
Grenoble, France
The Differential Hybird
The note from Robert G. Schaffrath [Forum,
July] is itself “not quite correct.” The “new” class of
hybrids, as defined by the Toyota Synergy Drive Hybrid,
is neither a series nor a parallel hybrid. I consider
this system a “differential hybrid.”
The differential hybrid configuration uses two
motor/generators, a mechanical differential power
combiner and a battery with associated controllers to
split the output of the internal combustion engine into
two channels of power flow. It can assume any state
between a full series hybrid and a full parallel hybrid.
In one extreme condition, the power flow is purely
mechanical, as in the parallel hybrid. As Schaffrath
correctly indicates, this is the highest efficiency mode
to deliver the internal-combustion-engine power to the
drive wheels. Unfortunately, this does not allow the
internal combustion engine to operate at its most
efficient point over a range of vehicle conditions.
In the other extreme condition, equivalent to a
series hybrid, all the internal combustion engine power
is delivered to the drive wheels via the dual
motor/generator set. The advantage here is that the
internal combustion engine’s operating point can be set
to the system optimum by controlling the motor/generator
set. The disadvantage is that there are extra losses
associated with the motor/generator set.
Obviously, any intermediate power split can be
achieved by setting the power split between the two
extremes. The cost is the extra motor/generator, control
complexity, and the associated losses.
General Motors and Chrysler have recently announced a
Dual Mode Hybrid. It is my understanding that it is a
differential hybrid with an added transmission in the
internal-combustion-engine power-flow path. This
approach allows for more of the engine power to be
delivered via a more efficient mechanical path. The
potential advantage of this system is better highway
fuel efficiency.
William C. Follmer
IEEE Life Member
Livonia, Mich.
DMCA: The Darker Side
“Death by
DMCA” [June] kindly illustrates some of the
impacts of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. It
fails, however, to mention the darker side: the outright
theft from the public domain. Current U.S. copyright law
has a 95-year term limit, after which works become a
part of the public domain. These legally protected
digital locks don't simply disappear after the 95-year
copyright has expired. In order to legally copy an
expired copyrighted work, must one illegally break the
digital lock? It is a shame that private interests bring
conflict of law into such a broad public forum.
Apparently the authors of the Audio Broadcast
Licensing Act and the Analog Hole Bill are also
oblivious to these time limitations of copyright law.
Adding a copy protection parameter of “ok to copy after
date x” would go a long way to complying with current
law. And proposals to cryptographically bind legal
digital recordings to the initial recording device
attempt to take away legal personal usage.
Does anyone actually think that the bound recording
device will still be physically functioning when the
copyright period expires? Failure to allow transfer to a
functioning device takes away fair use once obsolescence
or hardware failure set in.
Will those who advocate commercial skipping as theft
of advertising time soon seek to make Internet pop-up
blockers illegal? I haven’t yet received a check that
paid me to watch commercials, so it seems it is my
time—not theirs.
Maybe instead of Hollywood spending money to make a
mockery of the legal system, it would be better off
charging a fair price for its works. Or, if old
copyright laws are deemed insufficient for the
fast-paced digital millennium, maybe legal protection of
the locking mechanisms should be granted—in exchange for
a licensing fee, a 20-year copy term, and a free
download of the work at the end of the term.
Robert A. Marshall
IEEE Senior Member
Austin, Texas
The implications of the DMCA are indeed outrageous.
Hollywood seems to be leaving no stone unturned to kill
innovations. Hollywood could demand a royalty from the
sale of the gizmos, but putting a curb on the design
freedom of the devices is wrong. Why put innovation on
the sacrificial altar when it ought to be the wrongdoers
who should be punished?
Bharath Bhushan Lohray
IEEE Student Member
Ahmedabad, India
Looking at LIGO
The article “Waiting
for Gravity” by Trudy E. Bell [July] gives
a clear feeling for the many horrible technical problems
facing the designers of the Laser Interferometer
Gravitational Wave Observatory (LIGO). But it does not
mention one problem that has been bothering me since
people started talking about the measurement of gravity
waves.
The wavelength of electromagnetic radiation responds
to the metric of the space in which it propagates;
witness the stretching of primordial gamma rays into the
microwave background that we observe today as an effect
of the expansion of the universe. If the wavelength
responds just like any other length, then the passage of
a gravitational wave will stretch and shrink the
wavelength of the laser light in the same ratio as the
length of the arms of the interferometer, and there will
be no phase shift. The result will be no signal, just as
in the case of the Michaelson-Morley experiment.
Einstein explained that one, but will a similar null
effect appear in LIGO? If not, why not?
G. Fonda-Bonardi
IEEE Life Senior Member
Los Angeles
LIGO scientists
Frederick J. Raab and Rainer Weiss respond:
The problem is that wavelength is a red herring when
considering interferometers. The interferometer measures
the differences in phases of the beams returned to the
beam splitter, not their wavelengths. The easiest way to
think about the phases in an interferometer is as
follows:
To avoid problems introduced by worrying over how to
connect local and nonlocal observations, imagine the
view of an observer sitting on the beam splitter.
To avoid worrying about mixing up things on different
time scales, don't worry about the entire cycle of the
light wave. Just consider the light that came in from
the laser at one point in time (delta function).
Now that you are comfortably seated on the beam
splitter, have your assistant, Zweistein, adjust the
interferometer mirrors so that the two arm lengths are
equal. Here is how you can check on whether Zweistein
did it right and gets paid. If the two arm lengths are
equal, then the incoming delta function splits into two
outgoing lengths (one in each arm).
Sometime later the delta functions return. If no
strong gravity waves come by (a good assumption, but you
can do many trials if you want to check), then the two
delta functions should arrive back at the beam splitter
“simultaneously.” Their simultaneous arrival causes them
to merge into a single delta function that returns
toward the laser, with no light falling onto the
photodetector in the so-called “dark” port. In this
case, Zweistein should get paid.
Now continue firing delta functions from the laser
and wait for a gravity wave to come by. If a gravity
wave comes by, space will shrink along one arm and
stretch along the other. Since the only thing that is
not relative in relativity is the speed of light, the
asymmetry introduced into the arm lengths will cause the
returning delta functions to arrive at slightly
different times, so they cannot merge into a single
delta function going back toward the light. This results
in light falling onto the photodetector in the “dark”
port. Now you can get paid!
Once this gravity wave detection is announced, there
will be many arguments in bars and coffeehouses around
the world as to whether the detected space-time
distortion showed up as a change in space or a change in
time, or something in-between. After all, it’s all
relative. In the meantime, enjoy the pizza and beer
(simultaneously) that you bought after you got paid.
Peter R. Saulson gave a nice description of this
result in an article in the American Journal of
Physics [Vol. 65, June 1997, pp. 501–505].
The steps are basically the mathematical description of
the narrative above. The metric allows you to follow the
relation between time and space during the space-time
distortion, which changes negligibly over the arms,
since they are way shorter than the gravity wave
wavelength. The nonrelativity of light speed is given by
the expression ds2 = 0, where
ds2 is the squared length of
the space-time interval along a light beam. Plug it in
and voilà, the delay between the arrival times of the
delta functions falls out.
Frederick J. Raab
Director, LIGO-Hanford (Wash.)
This question of the wavelength of the light
stretching with the gravitational wave and making it
impossible to use light as a means of detecting a
gravitational wave has been around from the beginning.
It comes from a misunderstanding and also from combining
several mutually canceling ideas.
One approach is to let the space not be changed by
the gravitational wave but have the gravitational wave
exert tidal forces on the masses. This is the approach
used by Joe Weber. He found it convenient this way to
include the other forces on his acoustic bar detector.
In this way of looking at it, there is no change in the
way the light behaves and there really is a physical
motion of the mirrors. Many of us do not like this
approach, because it becomes more difficult to use when
in the regions of strong gravitational fields, the
regions at the source and unfortunately not at the
detector.
The alternative way to think about the process is to
have the mirrors stay at fixed locations in the space
(like markers on a rubber sheet) and determine the
distance between them by timing the light. The
wavelength of the light is not relevant to this timing.
Rainer Weiss
Professor emeritus of physics, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, and designer of the LIGO beam
tube
Really Robotic
I was interested by Spectral
Lines, “Robots Can Ape Us, But Will They Ever
Get Real?” [July]. The subject of sentient robots or
machines capable of reproducing themselves is a fertile
area for science-fiction writers. Since the imaginings
of science fiction are often prophetic of actual
developments in the future, we should pay close
attention to the possibilities they raise.
Of the few science-fiction thinking machines I
recall, HAL in 2001: A
Space Odyssey is the most benign. While
HAL decided to kill off the humans on the mission
because they might interfere with its goals as HAL saw
them, HAL could not reproduce itself. The visions of
Fred Saberhagen in his Berserker series of
novels and the Dune series of novels
by Frank Herbert, as extended by Brian Herbert and Kevin
J. Anderson, definitely represent worst-case scenarios
for self-replicating thinking machines.
Saberhagen’s Berserkers actively
seek out life and destroy it but are capable of forming
temporary alliances with living beings who are willing
to betray their kind. The Omnius Evermind of the
Synchronized Worlds imagined by the Dune authors is
willing to use humans as slaves and vassals but sees
little value in keeping them around if they interfere
with the plans of the Evermind. Both were creations of
people who thought they were doing good but lost control
of their charges. If we are to learn anything from
history and from the visions of possible futures
revealed to us, we must make sure that humans keep
control of their creations.
William A. Brewer
IEEE Member
Rochester, N.Y.
Caught in the Ring
I am an “ex-pat” living and working in the Birmingham
area, in the United Kingdom, and would like to comment
on Justin Mullins’ article “Ring of
Steel II” [July]. He states that the
public has not voiced an opinion on the privacy issues
that go along with 24/7 surveillance. While this may be
true of the public spaces video cameras, it is not the
case with highway and moving vehicle surveillance. I can
attest that the people I work with and am acquainted
with absolutely despise the traffic cameras.
The main difference between the acceptance of public
space video surveillance and the hostility concerning
traffic cameras is simple. Public space cameras tend to
catch willful lawbreakers. People who break windows, rob
pedestrians, and cause street brawls are recorded,
found, and prosecuted.
The traffic cameras catch unintentional lawbreakers.
If you are speeding and are caught by a uniformed law
enforcement officer, the officer can generally tell the
difference if you were willfully speeding or just not
paying attention. The officer can then make a value
judgment to issue a violation or a warning. In the case
of the camera, you are guilty, and any extra
circumstances are ignored. That is what gets the average
citizen mad. The camera assumes everyone is a suspect.
As people start driving at the speed limit, the net
grows tighter. Since overall revenues decrease with
compliance, the camera operators must reduce the margin
for error and issue violations for as little as 3 miles
per hour over the limit of the posted 40 miles per hour.
That is probably within the statistical variance of
accuracy of both the camera equipment and the passenger
car speedometer. I have seen drivers abruptly slow
considerably below the speed limit in the camera zones
for that reason (only to speed away later). Does that
sound like a safe maneuver?
This has less to do with privacy, and more to do with
money. The existing London traffic video system is
currently being used to charge drivers for the privilege
of using the streets of London. The stated reason is an
attempt to decrease the traffic flow in the city.
However, the revenue brought in by this system tells a
different story. Last year the “Congestion Charge” in
London brought in about £2 260 000. About half of this
was enforcement revenue. Of this, the company in charge
of installing, maintaining, and enforcing the system
(Capita) gets a cut of the enforcement revenue and a £3
000 000 per month maintenance fee. Transportation for
London (a government agency) declared that the system
brought £50 000 000 into the city coffers, which leaves
the bulk of the money, £176 000 000 , being eaten by the
private contractor Capita.
This is looking more like a fishing trip all the
time. Londoners are not united on the joys of congestion
control. Only an estimated 18 percent reduction in
traffic was reported by the Times of London,
and that is in a very small area. The Tube is still
insanely crowded, and I don’t know what Mullins is
referring to when he states that there is “a more
pleasant working environment for Londoners.”
As for traffic enforcement using cameras, the story
is basically the same. In 2003, there were 4500 speed
cameras in use on UK roads, bringing in £1 200 000.
During the same time, traffic fatalities in the UK as a
whole increased 2 percent and in places like Essex,
increased by 24 percent. West Midlands police reported
that only 4 percent of motor vehicle collisions were due
to excessive speed.
Most of these cameras are placed in order to trap the
maximum “fish.” Remember, the stated reason for
installation of such devices is to improve law
enforcement. Also remember they are paid for by the
fines collected. If a camera actually did the job, who
would pay for it? With the widespread installation of
these camera systems and the claims by the builders of
great enforcement gains, the overall police force has
stagnated or been reduced.
In the United Kingdom, the police force was decreased
from 8900 to 6500 over the time the cameras have been
installed. Clearly that has had a detrimental effect on
traffic safety. Cameras can only detect speeders. The
reckless driver that is involved in or causes the
majority of motor vehicle collisions is only blunted by
police on the street. In this case, we have placed our
trust in the technology when the facts tell us
differently. This is another situation where the good
intentions of hard-working engineers are turned for
profit and away from the designed improvement of life.
These statistics are from reports published by the West
Midlands Police, The
Register (newspaper), and The Guardian (newspaper).
Kenneth Kozol
IEEE Member
Birmingham, England