PHOTO: IBM
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Richard L. Garwin is an IBM Fellow Emeritus and a
fellow of the IEEE, the American Physical Society, and
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He earned his
doctorate in physics under Enrico Fermi at the
University of Chicago in 1949, played a key role in
designing the first hydrogen bomb, at Los Alamos
National Laboratories, and worked at IBM from 1952 to
1993. He has taught at Columbia University and Harvard’s
Kennedy School of Government, and he has advised the
Pentagon and the government for 40 years. He served from
1993 to 2002 as chairman of the U.S. State Department’s
nonproliferation advisory board and in 1998 as a member
of the Rumsfeld commission on emergent ballistic missile
threats.
IEEE Spectrum sounded Garwin out on his views about
the presumed North Korean nuclear test of 9 October.
Four days later the U.S. government detected radiation,
and on Monday 16 October it confirmed that a nuclear
test had indeed occurred. —William Sweet
IEEE Spectrum: Dr.
Garwin, are you confident that a test in fact took
place—that it was not a fake?
GARWIN: There was an explosion. I think it’s highly
probable that it was a nuclear weapons test.
It was a fraction of a kiloton. They could easily and
affordably have made an ammonia nitrate/fuel oil
explosion of that magnitude: 500 tons [of material] is
just enough to fill a substantial room, 10 meters by 10
meters by 5 meters high.
But why in the world would they have done that? And
why would they have told the Chinese just 20 minutes
before the test that they were getting ready to test a
4-kiloton device, as CNN has reported, if they knew it
was going to be a lot less?
I gather from what
you’re saying that you accept the mainstream
estimate of about a half kiloton?
Yes, more or less, with an uncertainty range of about
a factor of two.
What do you conclude
then about the test? If they were shooting for 4
kilotons but got a half kiloton, what do you suppose happened?
They were shooting for four or even more. If
I were getting ready to test, I wouldn’t give people my
central estimate, I’d tell them what I’m really quite
confident of achieving. So perhaps they were really
aiming for more like 5 to 15 kilotons, as the Russian
foreign minister has reported.
But let’s assume [conservatively] they were going for
4 or 5 kilotons and they got a half kiloton, maybe.
There are two possible reasons: they got the design
wrong, or they just had bad luck.
How could they have got
the design wrong?
If they had just copied the U.S. design of 1945 they
would have had an 8000-pound [3629 kilogram], 5-foot
diameter bomb that would have given them 20 kilotons,
and that would have been hard to miss unless they
misfired some of the explosive detonators, or whatever.
But probably they were trying to make something in the
500- to 1000-kg class that would fit on their SCUD
missile, for threatening South Korea, or on their Nodong
[missile], for delivery to Japan. Then they would be in
uncharted territory, and they may just have done the
calculation wrong, for example in the amount of
plutonium or explosive that’s required to obtain the
design yield.
But they also could have just been unlucky.
Remember, when the Los Alamos group was readying the
first U.S. test bomb, Robert Oppenheimer wrote to
General Groves telling him that there was a chance of a
stray neutron triggering a fizzle. The plutonium itself
releases neutrons spontaneously—which is why you can’t
make a gun-type nuclear explosive from plutonium,
something that was discovered very late in the game at
Los Alamos. Oppenheimer said there was a 2 or 3 percent
chance of a fizzle, and that there might be a
substantial reduction in yield—but that it could never
go lower than 5 or 10 percent of the expected yield.
[In
a gun design, a
bullet of fissile material is shot at a target of
the same material to form a critical mass, which is
necessary for detonation. Stray neutrons, however,
could trigger a small, “predetonation” explosion, or
fizzle, that forces the bullet from the target,
forestalling the process.]
So North Korea could
have been shooting for 10 kilotons, but got just a
half kiloton because of bad luck.
Right.
I gather you completely
exclude the possibility of their deliberately trying
to make a very low-yield weapon, which would be very
difficult, would it not?
There’s no chance they were trying to do that.
And it must have been a
plutonium device? They couldn’t possibly have
obtained enough highly enriched uranium to, for
example, build a primitive gun-type bomb?
I don’t know where they would have got it, and that
would have taken about 60 kg of fissile material, as
opposed to 5 or 6 kg of plutonium for an elementary
implosion device, in which multiple explosive charges
compress a ball of plutonium into a ball of higher
density and thus lower critical mass.
How significant is this
test, given that the mainstream intelligence view
for several years has been that North Korea already
has several nuclear weapons?
I said that myself, as a member of the nine-member
Rumsfeld commission. We judged in 1998 that they had one
or two nuclear weapons.
This gets pretty
speculative, but do you think they were just testing
something they had sitting around for some time, or
were they trying to do something new or better?
It’s to be assumed that they have about 40 kg of
separated plutonium now, enough for another six
implosion weapons. But they might have taken plutonium
from one of their earliest bombs and inserted it into
something slimmer [to make a more deliverable weapon].
We’ve done that kind of thing.
On balance, given that
we’ve been assuming the North Koreans have a small
nuclear stockpile, and considering that this test
was not as successful as they were looking for it to
be, how would you assess the significance of this event?
I would say that they are not quite as far along as we
thought and probably they thought. But it won’t take
them long, so I’d expect another test within a few
months that’s likely to be a successful 4- or 5-kiloton
device.
Of course each time they test they use up 5 or 6 kg of
that valuable stockpile, so there’s a cost to testing.
But on balance you think
they need to mount a more successful test, and that
they will.
Yes.
Background on Richard Garwin’s career, work, and
opinions is available at http://www.fas.org/RLG/