Early computer
attacks, such as the widespread Melissa virus
of 1998, incapacitated computers or clogged mail servers
with very heavy traffic. Such ploys inconvenienced
victims but didn't enrich culprits. Now attackers
increasingly go after valuable confidential information,
whether credit card numbers or government documents.
They're "hacking for fortune," as Symantec's Oliver
Friedrichs puts it. Mystery writers like Jackont might
prefer to say that the culprits have the classic
motive—money. They also have means and opportunity.
The ubiquitous Windows PC, with its history of
security problems, presents an enticing target. "A
couple of years ago, or even last year, most of the
attacks were basically targeting Web servers," says
Ullrich. But as software companies and system
administrators create better firewalls for servers,
attackers are moving on to smaller but more vulnerable
prey. Because many antivirus programs recognize only
threats that security experts have already seen and
defined, unique Trojans go undetected as they enter a
system.
Once a Trojan has duped a user into allowing it onto
a desktop, a well-configured firewall may later notice
the Trojan intruder when it communicates with the
outside world through unusual ports or addresses. But if
a clever Trojan sends confidential information over the
same port used for Internet access, no firewall can tell
the difference between normal Web-surfing and nefarious
activity.
The insidious Trojan attack is no longer a work of
black art. When Trojan horses first appeared in the
early 1970s, only programmers knew how to craft them.
Now, however, crooks can just point and click to alter
basic designs, thwarting antivirus software. They can
add hidden instructions—"Get me passwords and anything
called 'Top Secret'"—to ordinary files, be they
Microsoft Word documents or PDFs. Crooks can even create
Trojans that, by taking advantage of security flaws in
Web browsers, install themselves automatically when a
victim visits a deceptive Web site.
"So, should Company A decide that it doesn't have any
scruples and wants to get something inside Company B,"
says Mark Sunner, chief technology officer of
MessageLabs Ltd., an e-mail security company in
Gloucester, England, "the tool kits...are now available
to accomplish what three or four years ago would have
been a very complex technical thing to pull off."
To detect a
Trojan intruder lurking on a hard drive, it
helps to make sure that firewalls are optimally
configured, even if they can't be counted on to catch
every targeted attack. Under development, says
Symantec's Friedrichs, are methods of identifying
Trojans by tell-tale file modifications and other
suspicious behavior. A common clue for users is a
computer's suddenly performing ordinary tasks much more
slowly than normal.
To stop a Trojan from breaking and entering in the
first place, companies have recourse to proxy servers.
They essentially download files for a test run before
passing them on to a user's desktop, scanning each
attachment for potentially malicious software.
Yet truly avoiding infection, says Ullrich, "really
comes down almost exclusively to user education." Users
should regularly install software update patches offered
by software suppliers to minimize the flaws that Trojan
horses and other threats sometimes take advantage of. Of
course, it also helps to avoid keeping valuable
information on Internet-connected machines. Most
important, they should steer clear of unsolicited
attachments, links, and even disks and CDs.
Ordinary computer users may not enjoy greeting every
e-mail with skepticism. Pain, regrettably, often proves
to be the most effective teacher. Not long after the
Jackonts' novel appeared prematurely on the Internet,
their former son-in-law mailed Amnon a disk that
supposedly came from a student in Jackont's writing
class. "This disk, I never put in my computer," Jackont
says. "I gave it to the police."