My footsteps echo across the empty corridor,
and fluorescent lights flicker above my head. I'm in a
compound of boxy concrete buildings at the Resende
nuclear complex in southeastern Brazil. Ahead of me,
behind locked doors, is a vast, high-ceilinged hall. I
can't go in there, my escort tells me, but I shouldn't
take it personally. Even among the employees here, very
few have access to that hall, and those who do can't
talk about what's in there. Inside is the newest example
of one of the most heavily guarded technologies of the
industrial age.
This is where Brazil will soon produce enriched
uranium in industrial quantities to fuel its two nuclear
power reactors. That hall—this much is known—houses
hundreds of identical machines. They are slender,
upright cylinders topped by a maze of thin pipes, and
they sprawl around the room like a thick forest of
metal. The machines are uranium centrifuges. They spin
at supersonic speeds to accomplish a neat trick:
separating two types of uranium atom that are virtually
identical except for a minuscule difference in weight.
This separation process, known as enrichment, isolates
the uranium atoms that are fissile—the useful material
capable of sustaining a nuclear chain reaction—from the
rest.
All over the world, uranium centrifuges and other
enrichment technologies are treated as state secrets and
subject to stringent export controls. That's because the
same equipment used to enrich uranium into reactor fuel
can, with only minor modifications, also enrich it to a
far higher level to serve as bomb-grade material. So
while enrichment technology provides the lifeblood of
the nuclear power industry, it can also be instrumental
to the production of nuclear weapons.
Brazil's achievement comes at a time when concern is
running high over another enrichment program, in Iran.
Both countries are parties to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—the foundation of the
international regime that seeks to limit the spread of
nuclear weapons—but Brazil's program is notable for its
differences from Iran's: Brazil has consistently
fulfilled its obligations under the NPT, and the country
has forsworn nuclear weapons ambition since a democratic
government replaced the military dictatorship that ruled
the country from 1964 to 1985.
With its new Resende plant, Brazil is joining the
exclusive club of nations that operate commercial-scale
centrifuge facilities. These include Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom— these three
forming the Urenco Ltd. consortium—plus Russia, China,
and Japan. The United States and France enrich uranium
through a different process called gaseous diffusion,
although both countries plan to build centrifuge plants.
[See table, "Who Does
Enrichment?"]
"The Brazilian case, the only thing that's really
strange about it is the secrecy thing—there's no good
explanation for it"