POWER & ENERGY
During the summer of 1999, searing heat waves
across the United States set air conditioners
roaring and brownouts rolling through the grid—that
network of substations, transformers, cables, and
towers that conducts the flow of electricity from
supply center to demand point. While local utilities
faced outages at the distribution level in the
mid-Atlantic states, grid operator PJM Interconnection
LLC, of Norristown, Pa., kept its transmission network
humming, though not without some difficulty and what
the company calls "learning experiences."
PJM is an independent system operator, that is,
an independent organization coordinating the
movement of power through the transmission network
across and within its region. Transmission networks,
like the one PJM manages, operate at 230 kV and
higher, channeling electricity into and out of
utility-controlled lower voltage subtransmission and
distribution networks [see ""].
As part of its services, PJM ensures that the
grid remains stable, regardless of power flow, and
that the right parties receive and pay for the energy
moved through its system. It does its job well—or
so the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),
in Washington D.C., seems to think. When the commission
issued Order No. 2000 in December 1999 calling for
the establishment of regional transmission
organizations (RTOs) or coordinating bodies, it cited
PJM repeatedly, in footnotes, as a good example to
follow [see ""].
PJM has coordinated the transmission grid across
most of the Mid-Atlantic states ever since 1927,
when it began as a power pool. Formed of a group of
power systems, it operated as an interconnected
system sharing resources in Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia. (Back then, PJM stood for the first three
of those states, but today it serves simply as a
reminder of its origins.) The current company
established itself as a separate entity from its
original pool members in 1993, receiving FERC approval
in 1997 to become an independent system operator. In
January 1998, it became fully functional, complying
as well with FERC Order No. 888, which required it
to offer all comers open and equal access to the
transmission network it operated [Tables 1 and 2].
Having expanded from a pool of seven members into
a grid operator with over 170 participants
nationwide, PJM now controls over 12 870 km of
bulk-power transmission line and dispatches (or
orders to run or not) 540 generating units. By all
accounts, PJM gets high marks for the work it does.
But even a smooth grid operator like PJM has what it
sees as one cloud on the horizon—proposed legislation
that would give enforcement power to what is now a
voluntary body charged with overseeing grid
reliability across North America.
On the high wires
Because there is never a time when electricity is
not in demand, and because the storage of electricity
on a large scale is impractical, PJM is constantly doing
something of a high-wire act. It oversees the market
for electricity in its region, simultaneously handling
the logistics for its transfer from power producers
(either directly or through a third party) to
utilities and large power consumers. Specifically, the
company balances demand, including load and line
losses, with supply—that is, power generated for its
territory (known as network generation whether generated
within its territory or not). At the same time, it must
account for the power just moving through its grid
enroute to another territory (so-called interchange
power).
The nucleus of this operation is just five people
and five workstations in an underground bomb-proof
control room, in a nondescript building, in an
industrial complex near Valley Forge, Pa. Of course,
more controllers are on duty if it is a period of
high demand, as in the summer, or if an event, say a
hurricane, is likely. Behind the scenes, however,
are hundreds of employees who handle metering,
accounting, market development, customer relations,
engineering, member and employee training, and other
business operations necessary to manage the flow of
electricity.
The five control room operators each sit at an
expansive workstation fitted with computers and
telephones. Two things strike the first-time visitor:
how few people are in the large room and the
magnitude of the schematic of the transmission
network occupying its entire front wall. The drawing is
6 meters high. Despite the serious nature of the job
and the unremitting pressure to be on the alert for
any anomaly or alarm, the setting looks a picture of
calm from the viewing gallery on the floor above.
(Almost never is a visitor allowed on the control
room floor.)
Control room operators are trained extensively in
all aspects of the job, learning the
responsibilities of each of the five stations over time.
Every workstation has its own computers to handle
its particular function and area of responsibility,
though all are networked. At the back of the room sit
the market transaction and scheduling coordinators,
who handle the generating capacity market [see
Fig. 1].
Their job is to evaluate bids for power generation as
they come in, and schedule the appropriate
resources—generation and transmission.
At the front left corner of the room (in front of
the market coordinator's workstation) is the
generation coordinator, who is responsible for balancing
demand and generation, dispatching additional units
as demand spikes. This coordinator faces both the
transmission map and a bank of monitors on the left wall
that display data from generating units at a glance.
To the right of the generation coordinator's
workstation is the transmission grid coordinator,
whose job is to handle real-time operation of the grid,
ensuring that lines are never overloaded anywhere.
This workstation sits directly in front of the huge
transmission network map, showing substations and power
plants, digital voltage readouts, and flashing
alarms to indicate the location of any problem.
Proximity to the map lets the grid operator keep an eye
on it, as well as on the data on the computer
displays at the transmission workstation.
At a fifth workstation in the right rear corner
of the room is the shift supervisor who is charged
with assisting any coordinator at any of the other
workstations when needed.
As might be expected, all this coordination
requires state-of-the-art computer systems,
especially in the software used to run them. Even the
energy management system, an off-the-shelf system,
is highly customized for PJM's needs, noted Bob
Reed, manager of the company's operations planning
group. Tracking the information used by the
coordinators to make decisions and by the billing
department to charge for services rendered requires
highly sophisticated software, much of which is
proprietary. Crucial details that are tracked include
what the price is to move energy across any given
transmission lines, who has transmission rights
during times of constraint (a constrained line is one
very near or just over its electricity-carrying
capacity), how much power is financially hedged,
what generation is available at what cost, who is moving
power through PJM to a neighboring control area, and
who is importing power to PJM territory.
Key to the requisite software are complex
algorithms that have been developed over many years
to analyze supply and demand scenarios. Every 2 seconds,
for instance, dispatch signals are calculated and
sent to local control centers. And every 2 minutes,
800 thermal and voltage contingencies (spikes, sags, and
other sudden-event possibilities) are assessed,
resulting in a contingency analysis report of all
PJM monitored facilities. The volumes of data involved
are massive: 5300 telemetered values from around the
region are read every 2 seconds; another 6000 values
for generating units are available every 14 seconds;
and 18 000 available transmission capacity values must
be updated daily.
The software and other intellectual property
embodied in these algorithms was developed by PJM
power pool members before PJM became an independent
entity. Now in the process of purchasing the
software from those members, PJM has an eye toward
possibly marketing it to other grid operators in the
future.
Pricing for the market
As an independent system operator (ISO), PJM
coordinates multiple markets, including those for long-
and short-term generating capacity and energy
(transmission), an auction for transmission rights,
and a regulation market. This last governs ancillary
services provided by units that can be started or
stopped by PJM nearly instantaneously in response to
grid stability issues.
The capacity markets enable PJM to add or to
recall capacity by requesting that certain
generating units start up or shut down to maintain grid
reliability—the outage-free grid operation
maintained by the smooth, synchronous running of the
generators supplying it with current. If the current
furnished by a generator exceeds the limit of its
protective relay setting, the unit will disconnect
from the grid, affecting the current supply of the
still-connected generators. If the situation
persists, more generators will disconnect from the
grid until a blackout or unstable condition occurs.
"Reliability is the single biggest issue [PJM]
handles" as a regional grid operator, Richard A.
Drom, PJM vice president and general counsel, emphasized
to IEEE Spectrum.
Generally, the grid and generation coordinators
look at what generators must run to ensure a stable
grid, which provide the cheapest power, and where power
enters and leaves the grid. Pricing is fairly
straightforward. A power purchaser—a utility,
say—contracts to take X kilowatt-hours on a specific
day and time at a cost of so much each. The marginal
power price is the cost of the X+1 kilowatt-hour,
whether that is the same cost for, or higher than, the
Xth kilowatt-hour. During an emergency, any
generator could suddenly become a must-run unit to
ensure grid stability, however high the price set for
its generated power. PJM dynamically determines
must-run units in such a situation. Bids for power
produced by these units are capped to certain levels to
avoid price-gouging by generators.
Within PJM's transmission or energy market, three
options are available. Utilities can self-schedule
their own resources to meet local needs, transfer power
among themselves (bilateral transactions), or buy
and sell power (and thus its transfer, too) on the
spot market. Self-scheduling merely means meeting local
demand, though power must flow through PJM-controlled
lines on its way from utility plants to utility
customers. Bilateral transfers are power transfers
between two utilities, at least one of which is within
the PJM control area.
The spot market is the real-time, bid-based
energy market where power can be bought and sold on
an hourly basis by PJM's 170 members. Bids and offers
for energy are accepted on a daily basis. A
day-ahead market—buying power on the day previous
to the day the power is received—is scheduled to begin
operating in June 2000 (market trials were under way
at press time).
Customers outside the PJM control area must
schedule their expected use of the spot market. All
generation nominated as installed capacity is required
to bid into the market and may be scheduled as
must-run units by PJM to fend off instability. Units
not nominated for installed capacity may bid voluntarily
on a day-to-day basis. All bids are final as to price by
noon of the day preceding the date of use.
While transmission pricing is fixed by tariffs
filed by PJM with FERC, the overall cost of moving a
block of power from point to point may not be fixed.
When demand is high, power lines become congested or
constrained (operating at or above capacity), and
costs for their use are higher. (Capacity can be
affected by humidity and temperature, and a line
that exceeds its capacity could drop out of service,
causing problems throughout the grid.)
To allow for these problems, PJM has a related
market power mitigation procedure. When transmission
constraints occur, PJM may price-cap generating
resources needed to relieve congestion. This
procedure, was approved by FERC, effective 1 April
1999, within PJM's control area, explained Lesley
Collons, a PJM engineer in the customer relations
and training department.
In dealing with congestion, PJM employs
locational marginal pricing (LMP). Also known as
nodal pricing, LMP is the cost of supplying the next
1000 kW of load at a specific location, figuring in
generation marginal cost and the cost of
transmission congestion. As a result, this pricing is
one value for all locations when the transmission
system is unconstrained, and varies by location when
the system is constrained.
LMP, Collons said, "bases prices on how energy
actually flows, not a contract path." The latter is
literally a flow path for transmission specified in a
contract and generally does not reflect the physical
flow of electricity from point to point. When system
constraints occur, PJM controllers can curtail
transmission by starting and stopping specific
units, so as to reconfigure the system and alleviate
the problem.
If PJM must redispatch generation, the delivery
limitations of certain transmission lines may rule
out use of the least expensive generator available. In
that instance, PJM may call on a high-cost generator
nearer to the load instead of the lower-cost
generator. When it bills a member for the service
rendered in this case, the higher-cost generation is
listed as the "security constrained redispatch
cost," Collons told Spectrum.
As a hedge of sorts against locational marginal
pricing, PJM uses fixed transmission rights so that
market participants may manage congestion risk. These
rights are a financial contract that entitles their
holder to a revenue stream, based on hourly energy
price differences across the transmission path. Although
the rights can be traded separately from transmission
service, they permit their holder to have some price
certainty during anticipated times of system
constraint.
Reliability key to stability
Lying entirely within the Eastern
Interconnection, one of four synchronous ac systems in
North America, is PJM. In each system, all the
generators operate in phase with one another. PJM
monitors tie lines across four interfaces connecting it
to its neighbors: the New York ISO, Allegheny Power,
FirstEnergy, and Virginia Power. A problem with any
tie line can create a problem for PJM. Should voltage
sag, for example, PJM control-room coordinators would
contact local control centers operated by the
utilities within its control area, notifying them of the
problem and implementing emergency procedures as
necessary.
The entire North American grid operates at a
nominal 60 Hz on four big circuits (one per
interconnection) linked by high-voltage dc tie lines. As
part of this grid, PJM also must maintain 60 Hz. If
a load suddenly draws more current, then a drop in
voltage and frequency will occur across the grid,
affecting the speed (frequency) of the generators
supplying current to the load.
If the generators no longer operate
synchronously, the one least affected by the sudden
change will attempt to supply additional current,
establishing a give-and-take relationship between
generators as they speed up and slow down in an attempt
to reestablish synchronicity. If the problem with
the line is eliminated in time, the generators will
regain synchronous operation. If not, the give-and-take
will escalate beyond protective limits until a
generator disconnects from the grid, causing an
outage. This failure could cascade, disconnecting
several generators from the grid.
The power outages in the scalding 1999 summer
were largely local in scope. They did not wipe out
an entire interconnection or even an entire region [see
"Restructuring
the thin-stretched grid"]. While the PJM
transmission grid did not undergo an outage, some
utilities in the PJM control area did have
distribution-level outages. What PJM encountered
were steep voltage declines on the transmission
system during load conditions that set a new record
peak. In response, operators instituted emergency
procedures on two separate days.
On the first day, voltages remained low for
several hours. On the second day of voltage sags,
voltages were restored rapidly, thanks to the emergency
procedures set up. Generators were redispatched,
some transmission was curtailed, and capacitor banks
were activated. These last are designed to provide
voltage support to the grid in the event such an
emergency arises. Grid reliability was maintained,
but the incidents served as a wake-up call to PJM and
its members, who took a fresh look at processes,
procedures, and tools available to remedy the
situation.
The system conditions of July 1999 were
unprecedented but afforded PJM a "learning opportunity,"
to quote the company's root cause analysis report.
According to the report: "Reactive demand was
exceedingly high because of record electricity
consumption resulting from high temperatures, high
humidity, a strong economy, and from increased
transmission system losses created by high transfer
levels across the system. Reactive supply was
insufficient to meet the demand because some generators
were unavailable or unable to meet their rated reactive
capacity because of ambient conditions and some
capacitors were not in service."
In short, the low voltage on the two days was due
to reactive demand exceeding reactive supply. (In an
ac circuit, the current generally leads or lags the
voltage. The current consists of an active component
in phase with the voltage and an out-of-phase or
reactive component.)
Economics vs.
reliability
Today, not only is PJM in charge of reliability
and grid security and stability for its area of
operation, but it is also the security coordinator for
that area under the North American Electric
Reliability Council (NERC), Princeton, N.J. Security
coordinators ensure outage-free grid operation across
a NERC region. Each of the 10 regions has at least one
security coordinator, but can have any number of control
areas. For example, the Florida Reliability
Coordinating Council has 14 control areas though only
one security coordinator. Coincidentally the territory
covered by the Mid-Atlantic Area Council (MAAC), is
virtually the same as PJM's control area. PJM relishes
its dual role and the authority given it as security
coordinator, but its pride in the role has sparked
some disagreement with NERC over pending legislation
designed to give NERC enforceable oversight.
The legislation would transform NERC from its
present voluntary state into a quasi-regulatory
body. In its new form, to be called the North American
Electric Reliability Organization (Naero), the
entity would acquire some authority to enforce its
reliability standards.
Currently four bills relating to NERC's
transformation are in various stages of debate in
the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate. Senate
bill 2098, sponsored by Senator Frank Murkowski
(Rep.-Alaska), is the furthest along in the legislative
process: hearings were held in April by the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, chaired
by Murkowski.
PJM's Drom questions what improvements to
reliability would result from the legislation.
"Operators [like PJM] have extensive emergency
powers to respond to situations. Operational
problems usually have to be addressed in seconds in
order to keep the grid lit," he said. Under the
legislation as now written, system operators would be
forced to comply with Naero rules and variances.
"Situations could arise where a system operator would
need a variance in order to balance the grid," he said,
"but instead of being able to respond to the situation
immediately, an operator would have to contact Naero
for a variance, explain it, get approval, and then
implement the solution. In an emergency situation, that
can take more time than is available to prevent a
cascading failure."
NERC staff bristle at this characterization of
the legislation's provisions. Dave Nevius, NERC vice
president, told Spectrum that "PJM
seems to be alone in objecting to the NERC consensus
legislative language on reliability that appears in
every major restructuring bill in Congress. Simply
stated, all systems operators, including ISOs and
RTOs, would be expected to follow a common set of
grid operating reliability rules to ensure that the
actions of one do not adversely affect another." As
he explained, "The variances would be predetermined
and preapproved by both FERC and Naero. Once approved,
they become the rules by which the system is operated."
Drom's concern is that legislation may put
economics ahead of reliability. If the regulations
Congress is considering are written to favor economics
(low-cost generators must be dispatched over higher
cost ones) rather than reliability (dispatch those
generators required to maintain grid stability,
regardless of the cost of generation), reliability
will suffer. Stressed Drom, "Reliability must take
precedence in the legislation just as it does in the
dispatch center." In a conversation with Spectrum, Nevius
retorted: "That is exactly what the legislation
does."
Next in PJM's future
Once approved as an RTO by FERC, PJM's next step
is to look beyond its own territory. Right now, Van
Billet, PJM's chief financial officer, told Spectrum, "despite
the fact that PJM and its members depend on real-time
information 24/7, it isn't practical to trade that
sort of data across regions." The methodologies of the
neighboring ISOs and utilities are not consistent
across boundaries. "We all use different computer
systems, present information differently—it can be
confusing for customers [ISO users] to go back and
forth," Billet acknowledged. "My vision is a
consistent 'virtual ISO' across regions whose boundaries
are invisible" to users but an entity that would have
several RTOs and ISOs behind it. "That's the
efficiency of the virtual marketplace. The sky's the
limit on customer-oriented innovation," he said.
Drom concurs, but sees such a vision unfolding
over time in carefully thought-out steps. "Once PJM
receives RTO approval, then the next step is greater
interregional coordination," he stated. He would
like to see PJM build on the memorandum of understanding
it has with ISOs to the north: New York, New England,
and Ontario's Independent Market Operator. "There
are opportunities for greater coordination with
neighbors to the south and west," he said.
PJM Interconnection maintains a
comprehensive Web site at
http://www.pjm.com,
which features documentation on its activities,
emergency procedures, training, and
much more.
For the complete text of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's Order No. 2000, visit the
commission's Web site at
http://www.ferc.fed.us.
For more information on the North American
Electric Reliability Council and its efforts to
become the North American Electric Reliability
Organization, visit their Web sites,
http://www.nerc.com and
http://www.naero.org,
respectively.
For details of the proposed grid reliability
legislation currently before the Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, see the committee's Web
site at http://www.senate.gov/~energy.