The increasing value of a network as its size
increases certainly lies somewhere between linear and
exponential growth [see diagram, "Growth Curves"]. The
value of a broadcast network is believed to grow
linearly; it's a relationship called Sarnoff's Law,
named for the pioneering RCA television executive and
entrepreneur David Sarnoff. At the other extreme,
exponential—that is,
2n—growth, has been called
Reed's Law, in honor of computer networking and software
pioneer David P. Reed. Reed proposed that the value of
networks that allow the formation of groups, such as
AOL's chat rooms or Yahoo's mailing lists, grows
proportionally with 2n.
We admit that our n log(n) valuation of a
communications network oversimplifies the complicated
question of what creates value in a network; in
particular, it doesn't quantify the factors that
subtract from the value of a growing network, such as an
increase in spam e-mail. Our valuation cannot be proved,
in the sense of a deductive argument from first
principles. But if we search for a cogent description of
a network's value, then n log(n) appears to be the
best choice. Not only is it supported by several
quantitative arguments, but it fits in with observed
developments in the economy. The n log(n) valuation for a
network provides a rough-and-ready description of the
dynamics that led to the disappointingly slow growth in
the value of dot‑com companies. On the other hand,
because this growth is faster than the linear growth of
Sarnoff's Law, it helps explain the occasional dot-com
successes we have seen.
The fundamental
flaw underlying both Metcalfe's and Reed's
laws is in the assignment of equal value to all
connections or all groups. The underlying problem with
this assumption was pointed out a century and a half ago
by Henry David Thoreau in relation to the very first
large telecommunications network, then being built in
the United States. In his famous book Walden (1854), he
wrote: "We are in great haste to construct a magnetic
telegraph from Maine to Texas; but Maine and Texas, it
may be, have nothing important to communicate."
As it turns out, Maine did have quite a bit to
communicate with Texas—but not nearly as much as with,
say, Boston and New York City. In general, connections
are not all used with the same intensity. In fact, in
large networks, such as the Internet, with millions and
millions of potential connections between individuals,
most are not used at all. So assigning equal value to
all of them is not justified. This is our basic
objection to Metcalfe's Law, and it's not a new one: it
has been noted by many observers, including Metcalfe himself.
There are common-sense arguments that suggest
Metcalfe's and Reed's laws are incorrect. For example,
Reed's Law says that every new person on a network
doubles its value. Adding 10 people, by this reasoning,
increases its value a thousandfold
(210). But that does not even
remotely fit our general expectations of network
values—a network with 50 010 people can't possibly be
worth a thousand times as much as a network with 50 000
people.
At some point, adding one person would theoretically
increase the network value by an amount equal to the
whole world economy, and adding a few more people would
make us all immeasurably rich. Clearly, this hasn't
happened and is not likely to happen. So Reed's Law
cannot be correct, even though its core insight—that
there is value in group formation—is true. And, to be
fair, just as Metcalfe was aware of the limitations of
his law, so was Reed of his law's.
Metcalfe's Law does not lead to conclusions as
obviously counterintuitive as Reed's Law. But it does
fly in the face of a great deal of the history of
telecommunications: if Metcalfe's Law were true, it
would create overwhelming incentives for all networks
relying on the same technology to merge, or at least to
interconnect. These incentives would make isolated
networks hard to explain.
To see this, consider two networks, each with
n
members. By Metcalfe's Law, each one's value is on the
order of n
2, so the total value of both
of these separate networks is roughly 2n
2. But suppose these two
networks merge. Then we will effectively have a single
network with 2n members, which, by
Metcalfe's Law, will be worth (2n)2
or 4n
2—twice as much as the
combined value of the two separate networks.
Surely it would require a singularly obtuse
management, to say nothing of stunningly inefficient
financial markets, to fail to seize this obvious
opportunity to double total network value by simply
combining the two. Yet historically there have been many
cases of networks that resisted interconnection for a
long time. For example, a century ago in the United
States, the Bell System and the independent phone
companies often competed in the same neighborhood, with
subscribers to one being unable to call subscribers to
the other. Eventually, through a combination of
financial maneuvers and political pressure, such systems
connected with one another, but it took two decades.
Similarly, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
commercial online companies such as CompuServe, Prodigy,
AOL, and MCIMail provided e-mail to subscribers, but
only within their own systems, and it wasn't until the
mid-1990s that full interconnection was achieved. More
recently we have had (and continue to have)
controversies about interconnection of instant messaging
systems and about the free exchange of traffic between
Internet service providers. The behavior of network
operators in these examples is hard to explain if the
value of a network grows as fast as Metcalfe's n
2.
There is a further argument to make about
interconnecting networks. If Metcalfe's Law were true,
then two networks ought to interconnect regardless of
their relative sizes. But in the real world of business
and networks, only companies of roughly equal size are
ever eager to interconnect. In most cases, the larger
network believes it is helping the smaller one far more
than it itself is being helped. Typically in such cases,
the larger network demands some additional compensation
before interconnecting. Our n log(n) assessment of
value is consistent with this real-world behavior of
networking companies; Metcalfe's n
2 is not. [See sidebar,
"Making the
Connection," for the mathematics behind this argument.]
We have, as well, developed several quantitative
justifications for our n log(n) rule-of-thumb
valuation of a general communications network of size
n. The
most intuitive one is based on yet another rule of
thumb, Zipf's Law, named for the 20th-century linguist
George Kingsley Zipf.