24 January 2008—Analyzing a U.S. wireless spectrum
auction sounds about as exciting as watching a chess
match. But as Bobby Fischer's recent passing reminds us,
once in a while chess matches are pretty exciting.
Observers have called 700 megahertz the last great
band of spectrum to come up for auction in this age of
ubiquitous wireless devices. By virtue of having a lower
frequency than today's third-generation services—which
all operate at 1700 MHz and above—its signals can
travel farther and better push their way through
apartment and office walls.
All told, 214 companies have met the qualifications of
the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to
participate in the complicated auction, which begins
today and involves five different blocks of spectrum—A,
B, C, D, and E—each with its own rules, advantages, and
limitations. The spectrum, totaling 84 MHz, was freed up
in the course of readying the United States' airwaves
for digital TV. By February 2009, UHF channels 60 to 67
have to be off the air to make way for the auction winners.
The auction, with a total of 1099 possible licenses,
could hardly be more complicated. All but a handful fall
into the A, B, and E blocks, which together add up to
just 30 MHz of spectrum and will be bid on in separate
small geographical areas. The C block is broken up into
12 larger geographical areas, but you can go for
nationwide coverage by making one of several permissible superbids.
The C block was already the most interesting chunk of
spectrum to be auctioned off in years for three reasons:
its large size, 22 MHz; its nationwide coverage; and its
excellent propagation characteristics. Then, last
summer, Google showed up to play.
Google offered to meet the FCC's minimum bid, which is
now a hefty US $4.6 billion, so long as two conditions
were met: the first was a rule that the winner had to
allow onto its network any device or service, no matter
who sold it, that complied technically with the
communications standards and protocols the winner chose
to use. That's in contrast to current spectrum licenses,
in which the licensed carrier can make itself the
exclusive gatekeeper of handsets and services, such as
ringtones, sports scores, or Web access. Second, Google
wanted the winner to be required to resell its network
service on a wholesale basis. Another company could
create a prepaid voice or data service, for example,
that would operate in the same spectral band, and the
licensed carrier would have to let it buy minutes or
messages at a discount.
Though the FCC imposed only the first requirement, in
November Google joined the roster of qualified bidders.
And it's one of only a few companies with the big bucks
needed to bid for a nationwide license.
Verizon Wireless also comes to the table with plenty
of cash. The company objected to the Google-inspired
rules, yet many observers expect it to be the most
aggressive bidder. Tom Elliott, a vice president at
Strategy Analytics, a marketing information company,
says Verizon “is going to be pretty serious about it.
They really want to build out their mobile data
offerings, especially for delivering television and
other video to cellphones.”
Besides Verizon and Google, the list of possible
C-block bidders features many of the usual telco
suspects, including AT&T and Alltel, as well as some
other companies far from the telecommunications field,
such as the oil and gas giant Chevron. But other major
carriers will sit this one out, notably T-Mobile, which,
less than a year ago, spent $3 billion on spectrum to
beef up its third-generation data network, and Sprint,
which is concentrating its resources on a
next-generation network for which it already has enough
spectrum. [See “Sprint's
Broadband Gamble,”
IEEE
Spectrum, January 2008]
Another nonparticipant will be Frontline Wireless, a
company that was created specifically to bid on D. That
block gives the winner the right to use 10 MHz worth of
nationwide commercial spectrum but comes with an unusual
obligation to operate a parallel national
emergency-services network. Two weeks ago, Frontline
folded as a company, and now many observers wonder if
anyone will come forward with the block's $1.3 billion
minimum bid.
If you hope to follow the auction as it's happening,
you may be in for a disappointment. For each round, the
FCC will announce the amount of the highest bid for each
license but not who offered it. It's a bit like hearing
the moves of a chess tournament without knowing which
player made them—and about as frustrating.
But anonymous bidding was needed to “reduce the
potential for anticompetitive bidding behavior,” in the
words of the FCC. Researchers looking into U.S. spectrum
auctions going back to the 1990s—and as recent as the
February 2007 auction in which T-Mobile spent $3
billion—have concluded that the major carriers were
gaming the system. In April, economist Marshall Rose
released a study in which he argued that “both empirical
and theoretical evidence emerged that open
auctions—auctions in which the identities and bids of
all bidders were disclosed to the rest of the
bidders—could produce anticompetitive, inefficient, and
revenue nonmaximizing outcomes.”
Even if the action is obscured, surely industry
observers have picked some favorites to win. Or maybe
not. None of the analysts or other experts that IEEE
Spectrum interviewed were ready to predict just who
would bid on the C Block or how high the bidding might
go. Nadine Manjaro, a senior analyst for wireless
infrastructure at ABI Research, thought it might reach
$6 billion, but perhaps not much more, “because you have
to build [the network] as well. You don't want to put
yourself in a hole, bidding so much for spectrum that
there's no money left to provision it.” Carriers, she
says, look at one figure in particular: the average
revenue per user, or ARPU. “Even as wireless becomes a
higher portion of revenue, actual month-to-month ARPU
has declined, a sign that wireless service is becoming a commodity.”
Future networks, including ones based on the 700-MHz
spectrum, will carry far more data traffic than voice.
Both Verizon and AT&T have long-term plans to evolve
their cellular services to a technology called,
helpfully, Long Term Evolution. Noting that LTE requires
a minimum of 20 MHz of channel bandwidth, Manjaro
expects both companies to bid for the C Block to fill in
their holdings. “Current networks might not have 20 MHz
clear in every geographical area, and 700 MHz has better
propagation than the [1700- to 2100-MHz] spectrum they
already have.”
Action—or lack thereof—in the D Block's 10 MHz of
nationwide spectrum is even harder to predict. The
winner will have to build and maintain what the FCC
calls a Public Safety/Private Partnership, using other
spectrum in the 700-MHz range that has already been set
aside for police, fire, ambulance, disaster relief, and
other emergency and public services. One thing that will
depress the bidding is an onerous build-out requirement.
By 2019, the network has to cover 99.3 percent of the
sprawling U.S. landmass. On the plus side, the operator
can use the public safety part of the network
commercially, so long as it doesn't interfere with
public-safety traffic.
Frontline, which was formed by onetime FCC chair Reed
Hundt and other high-profile industry insiders, seemed
to have strong investor backing, including venture
capitalists John Doerr and James Barksdale. And the
nascent company was reportedly able to come up with the
$128 million deposit needed to bid for the D Block. The
$1.3 billion minimum bid, and a plan to make it back
was, however, apparently a different matter. Mike Dano
of RCR Wireless News predicts that no one will bid on
the block. “Who in their right mind would want to share
a network?” he asked in a 17 January 2008 column.
If no one does bid, the Public Safety/Private
Partnership concept might fall apart. (Similarly, if the
C Block's $4.6 billion minimum isn't met, the FCC can
drop the “Google rules,” making the spectrum more
attractive to traditional carriers like Verizon.) Mark
Gaynor, a management and information technologies
professor at Boston University, would like to see the
FCC impose the Google-inspired openness rules on D Block
and lower its price, or perhaps, in the public interest,
give it away.
Even at the current minimum of $1.3 billion, Google
just might fool everyone and bid on D instead of C,
regardless of the formidable build-out costs. Running a
public-service network with no clear business model
might make sense to a company whose motto is still
“Don't be evil.”